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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 What is game theory and how does it apply to Evolutionary Biology?  Game theory was 
originally developed to help portray how individuals interact with each other and it was mainly 
used in the economics and political science fields.  This area of mathematical study came about 
after World War II and was developed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.  It wasn’t 
until the 1970’s that George Price and John Maynard Smith began to apply game theory to 
evolution in trying to predict the behavior of animals in a species.  There are two main 
evolutionary trends we will study using game theory: 1) what happens to a species when some 
animals display aggressive behavior, but back down instead of fighting, and 2) how can animals 
cooperate together to live in harmony while still able to attain their own personal goals.   
John Nash, while working for the RAND Corporation, introduced what is now called the 
Nash-Equilibrium.  The Nash-Equilibrium is reached in a non-zero sum game when no one 
person can increase their outcome or “fitness” by deciding to change their strategy unless the 
other person also changes strategy.  Smith later advanced the idea of the Nash-Equilibrium and 
applied it to evolution to establish the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).  An ESS is a type of 
Nash-Equilibrium in which the ideas are applied only to populations and provisions are included 
for stability. The definition of an ESS is a strategy played by all members of an identical 
population, where no individual has any advantage over another, and mutant (or alternative) 
strategies can be reduced or surpassed.   
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In this paper, I will illustrate exactly how games are used to study the two questions 
mentioned earlier.  Before I discuss game theory as it applies to evolutionary biology, let me first 
give you an example of what is meant by a game. 
 A zero-sum game is a game that is played where the gain or loss of one player is equal to 
the gain or loss of the other player.  The sum of the gain of one player and the loss of the other 
player is zero.  For example, sports competitions are zero-sum games; one team wins and the 
other team loses.  Another example is Rochambeau or rock-paper-scissors.  The two players 
must each show their choice at the same time and one person wins while the other person loses.   
 To begin, we consider a scenario in which Jim and Ruth play a zero-sum game called 
“Confuse the Teachers”.  Jim and Ruth each have four possible moves. When Jim wins, Ruth 
pays him money and when Ruth wins, Jim pays her money.  A matrix of possible payoffs for 
each outcome of this particular version of the game is shown below. 
 Ruth 
Jim 
 A B C D 
A 12 -1 1 0 
B 5 1 7 -20 
C 3 2 4 3 
D -10 0 0 16 
 
In this matrix, the positive numbers represent the money that Ruth pays Jim and the negative 
numbers represent the money that Jim pays Ruth.  For example, if Jim and Ruth both selected 
move A, Ruth would have to pay Jim $12.   
 There are many different strategies to consider when playing a zero-sum game.  First, we 
need to think about what it means for one strategy to dominate another strategy.  A strategy is 
dominant if each outcome in that strategy is as good as or better than each outcome in another 
strategy and at least one outcome is definitely better.  Note in the example above that from 
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Ruth’s perspective the strategy of selecting B dominates the selection of C.  Each outcome in B 
is as good or better than those in C and in fact, if Ruth were to play B and Jim were to play A, 
she would get paid $1 which is definitely better than any outcome in C.  The Dominance 
Principle states that a rational person should never play a dominated strategy, so as long as Ruth 
is rational, she would never play C.  In light of these considerations, what are the options in this 
game? 
 Assuming that Jim and Ruth both want to maximize their own payoff or outcome, they 
should each play a strategy that would give them their highest possible outcome.  For this game, 
if Jim wants to maximize his outcome, he could play D in hopes of Ruth also playing D. 
However, Jim’s chance for loss if Ruth plays A is also great.  If Ruth wanted to maximize her 
outcome, she could play D in hopes that Jim would play B, but her chance for loss if Jim plays D 
is high.  If we look at each of the strategies rationally, Jim should always play C because he 
always wins money with C.  Ruth on the other hand should always play B because she loses very 
little, and has the opportunity to win if Jim happens to play A.  Although the higher numbers of 
16 (for Jim) and -20 (for Ruth) are tempting, if they were to make those choices, the chance of 
losing big is high. 
 This leads into the discussion of equilibrium in a zero-sum game.  An equilibrium 
outcome for this game is an outcome where if both players are selecting certain choices, then 
neither player has an incentive or desire to switch to a different choice.  In analyzing this game 
for Jim and Ruth, their equilibrium outcome is (C, B) in the order of (Jim, Ruth).  This means 
that if Ruth were set on playing B, Jim’s best option is C and he wouldn’t win anymore by 
switching to another choice.  For Ruth, if Jim were set on playing C, to minimize her losses, she 
should play B.  An equilibrium outcome does not necessarily maximize anyone’s payoff, it may 
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instead minimize a player’s losses.  This scenario simply serves as an example of what a game 
might entail. It should be noted that while games used in predicting animal behavior are similar, 
they are not necessarily zero-sum games.   
 
 
Game Theory and Evolution 
 Game theory is an area of study where mathematics is applied to social and 
environmental situations in which an attempt is made to describe behavior in planned situations 
where an individual’s triumph in making choices depends on the choices of others.  John 
Maynard-Smith was a founding member of the University of Sussex and the Dean from 1965-
1985.  He became a professor emeritus at the University of Sussex.  Smith is well known for his 
work in applying game theory to evolution and his pivotal idea of the evolutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS).  Smith was the first to use Hawk-Dove terms as a model of conflict in a two-
person game.  This model consists of two players engaged in a game in which neither player 
wants to concede to the other, but a conflict is the worst possible outcome for both players.  The 
Hawk-Dove model is primarily applied to game theory and evolutionary biology. 
Consider the scenario where there is a population of birds. Some of these birds display 
aggressive, or “hawk-like” behavior (and thus will be referred to as Hawks), while other birds in 
the population exhibit passive or “dove-like” behavior (and hence are referred to as Doves).  The 
competition within this species is over resources because all birds want to be as “fit” as possible.  
If a Hawk is competing for a resource, it will always fight the other bird.  If a Dove competes for 
a resource with another Dove it will display (show aggressive behavior), but not fight and run 
away if things start to look bad.  In this encounter, one Dove will outlast the other in displaying 
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and thus gain the resource while the other Dove will give up and run away.  If a Dove meets a 
Hawk, the Dove will simply run away leaving the prey item for the Hawk.  If a Hawk competes 
for a prey item with another Hawk, one will win and one will lose (and probably be badly injured 
during the conflict).  Each Hawk has a 50% chance of winning against another Hawk and in a 
Hawk-Dove conflict, the Hawk will always win.  In a Dove-Dove conflict, since one will win 
and the other will lose, each Dove has a 50% chance of winning. 
To analyze which type of bird has a better chance of survival, “fitness” points can be 
assigned to each of these conflicts.  The winner of any conflict will win 50 “fitness” points for 
gaining the prey item.  In a Hawk-Hawk conflict, the Hawk that loses will most likely be hurt so 
he will lose 100 “fitness” points.  In a Dove-Hawk conflict, the Dove will run away and neither 
gain nor lose any points and the Hawk will receive the 50 “fitness” points for gaining the prey.  
In a Dove-Dove conflict, both will display behavior, but one will eventually give up and run 
away so the other Dove will gain the 50 “fitness” points for the prey.  Each Dove will lose 10 
“fitness” points for the energy it takes to display.   
We now compute the payoffs for each conflict.  Since the Hawk-Hawk and Dove-Dove 
conflicts are based on probabilities (50% chance of winning or losing) those payoffs are actually 
average payoffs. 
 
 Hawk-Hawk conflict – 50-50 chance ½ (50) + ½ (-100) = -25 points (per Hawk) 
 Hawk-Dove conflict – Hawk always wins    50 points (Hawk) 
           0 points (Dove) 
 Dove-Dove conflict – each displays 1 wins ½ (50-10) + ½ (-10) =  15 points (per Dove) 
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This can be shown in a payoff matrix: 
 
 
 
 
 
Hawk 
 
 
 
Dove 
   Hawk                    Dove 
(-25,-25) (50,0) 
(0,50) (15,15) 
 
Using this payoff matrix, we can think about different mixes of populations for the birds.  If the 
population had a lot of Hawks, there would be a lot of conflict and many Hawks would be losing 
fitness points because of injury.  This population could then see a surge in the number of Doves s 
as the Hawks would diminish in fitness in a predominantly Hawk population while the Doves 
would not lose many fitness points since they won’t fight.  If the population was dominated by 
Doves, there wouldn’t be any fighting, however such a population could see a dramatic increase 
in the number of Hawks as they could easily gain access to resources since they will always win 
a Hawk-Dove conflict.  Neither of these situations constitutes an ESS for the bird population.  
The question then becomes, are there some numbers of Hawks and Doves where neither type of 
behavior provides any advantage over the other?  Recall that an ESS is a type of Nash-
Equilibrium in which the ideas are applied only to populations and provisions are included for 
stability. The definition of an ESS is a strategy played by all members of an identical population, 
where no individual has any advantage over another, and mutant (or alternative) strategies can be 
reduced or surpassed.   
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In order for both the Hawks and Doves to survive in the same population, I need to find 
an ESS where neither has an advantage over the other.  If the population in this situation had ¼ 
Hawks and ¾ Doves, I can figure payoffs for each. 
  Hawk 
  ¼ (-25) + ¾(50) = -6.25 + 37.50 = 31.25 
 
  Dove 
  ¼ (0) + ¾ (15) = 0 + 11.25 = 11.25 
 
For this case, it is obvious that a population consisting of ¼ Hawks and ¾ Doves gives the 
Hawks an advantage so it is not the ESS.  To find the ESS for this Hawk-Dove population, we 
need to consider two things: the payoffs for the Hawks and the Doves, and when the payoffs are 
equal.  Thus to determine the ESS we establish the following: 
Finding the ESS: 
 Let x = fraction of population that are Hawks 
 Let y = fraction of population that are Doves 
 
Then the constraints can be written as 
 Payoff Hawks = Payoff Doves      and   Hawks + Doves = 1 
 -25x + 50y = 0x + 15y         and  x + y = 1 
 
To find the ESS, I need to solve these two equations.  Since x + y = 1, solving for x gives  
x = 1 – y.  Substituting this into the other equation gives: 
  -25(1-y) + 50y = 0(1 – y) + 15y 
  -25 + 25y + 50y = 15y 
  -25 + 75y = 15y 
  60y = 25 
  y = 25/60 = 5/12 
 
Thus y = 5/12  and  x = 1- 5/12 = 7/12.  Using this split for the Hawk-Dove bird population we 
refigure their payoffs: 
  Hawk: 7/12(-25) + 5/12(50) = -14.58 + 20.83 = 6.25 
 
  Dove:  7/12(0) + 5/12(15) =  0 + 6.25 = 6.25 
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Since both the Hawks and the Doves have the same average payout, or gain of “fitness” 
points, with this split of the population, the ESS for this Hawk-Dove scenario is to have a 
population of 7/12 Hawks and 5/12 Doves.  This means that if the population of birds has 7/12 
Hawks and 5/12 Doves, neither has an advantage over the other and both types of birds will 
survive and thrive by earning enough “fitness” points through obtaining prey or other resources.    
Evolution will drive a population towards the ESS through natural selection.  This is true because 
the presence of an ESS causes mutant strategies to be overpowered.   Without an ESS, mutants 
could have better fitness than the average member of the population and thus cause significant 
changes . 
What happens if the value of gaining a prey item were to change?  Let’s look at a case 
where gaining prey will earn a bird 150 “fitness” points instead of just 50.  I will re-work this 
analysis to see what happens to the ESS.   
Hawk-Hawk conflict – 50-50 chance ½ (150) + ½ (-100) = 25 points (per Hawk) 
 Hawk-Dove conflict – Hawk always wins    150 points (Hawk) 
           0 points (Dove) 
 Dove-Dove conflict – each displays, 1 wins ½ (150-10) + ½ (-10) = 65 points (per Dove) 
 
Again, this can be shown in a payoff matrix: 
 
 
 
 
 
Hawk 
 
 
 
Dove 
   Hawk                    Dove 
(25,25) (150,0) 
(0,150) (65,65) 
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Just by looking at this payoff matrix, I notice immediately that there is never going to be a loss of 
fitness points, even during a Hawk-Hawk conflict.  This seems to me to give hawk-like behavior 
an extreme advantage because they will always be gaining in fitness and the Doves, while they 
won’t lose any fitness points either, will only gain in fitness when faced with another Dove.  Is 
there an ESS for this situation?  Let’s find out: 
Finding the ESS: 
 Let x = fraction of population that are Hawks 
 Let y = fraction of population that are Doves 
 
Then to find the ESS, I need to solve the following two equations: 
 
 Payoff Hawks = Payoff Doves      and   Hawks + Doves = 1 
 25x + 150y = 0x + 65y         and  x + y = 1 
 
Since x + y = 1, solving for x gives x = 1 – y.  Substituting this into the other equation gives: 
  25(1-y) + 150y = 0(1 – y) + 65y 
  25 - 25y + 150y = 65y 
  25 + 125y = 65y 
  60y = -25 
  y = -25/60 = -5/12 
 
Since y = -5/12 it follows that  x = 1+ 5/12 = 17/12.  Since it is not possible to have the split of 
the population consist of a negative fraction and one that is larger than 1, there is no ESS for this 
situation.  Although I already had doubts before I actually tried to find the ESS, showing this 
calculation proves to me that in order for a population to have an ESS, it is important to carefully 
select the value of gains and losses.  In the first simulation, the gain was less than the loss and in 
the second case the gain was greater than the loss.  In a conflict, the injury to the Hawk should be 
great because they are risking a lot in the fight.  That is why it is important that when analyzing a 
situation such as this, the value of the resources needs to be less than the loss due to injury.  In a 
situation where the gain is more than the loss, there is no penalty for fighting, therefore why 
would any bird choose to be a Dove?  This would almost force the entire population to  adopt the 
Mathematics & Evolution  10 
dominant Hawk strategy,  which would result in many fights.  Hawks would always receive the 
highest or best fitness. 
Up to this point, I have talked about the birds being either a Hawk or a Dove, but in 
reality, the birds usually have characteristics of both types and apply them at different times.  
The ESS for this population of birds, 7/12 Hawks and 5/12 Doves, really translates to the 
percentage of time that each individual bird would display each type of behavior.  The ESS 
correlates to the combination of Hawks and Doves where switching from one to the other would 
not provide any advantage.  According to evolution, birds will advance to use the Hawk strategy 
7/12 (58%) of the time and the Dove strategy 5/12 (42%) of the time.   
The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 Cooperation among individuals has long been a mystery.  What would make some people 
selfish all the time and other people cooperate or compromise in hopes of gaining in the long 
run?  The Prisoner’s Dilemma problem is a well known example of a non-zero sum game that 
deals with two people having to choose to either cooperate or not cooperate with each other.  The 
original problem is as follows: 
“Two suspects are arrested by the police.  The police have insufficient evidence 
for a conviction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer 
the same deal: if one testifies for the prosecution against the other and the other 
remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 
10-year sentence.  If both remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six 
months in jail for a minor charge.  If each betrays the other, each receives a five-
year sentence.  Each must make the choice of whether to betray the other or to 
remain silent.  Each one is assured that the other would not know about the 
betrayal before the end of the investigation and that there will be no revenge for 
the betrayal.  What should each do?” 
 
In this case, each prisoner needs to consider what happens if they choose to cooperate (stay 
silent) with their friend or if they choose to not cooperate (confess) with their friend.  This can be 
shown in a payoff matrix where the numbers represent the payoff to each person.  The negative 
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numbers represent time they spend in prison, and they are negative because prison is considered 
bad so it is represented by a loss. 
 Prisoner 1 
Prisoner 
2 
 Stay silent Confess 
Stay 
silent (-0.5, -0.5) (-10,0) 
confess (0,-10) (-5,-5) 
 
Looking at this payoff matrix, there is no strategy that is dominated by another so either prisoner 
could play either option, therefore no strategy can be ruled out.  In a case such as the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, there are many things to be considered.  Will these two people ever have any dealings 
again?  How much does each trust the other?  How strong is the friendship between the two 
prisoners?  Has either or both spent time in prison before? 
 All of these questions are things to think about when trying to predict the behavior of 
each individual.  If they aren’t good friends and aren’t likely to have any dealings again, they are 
more likely to try to confess first and get a better deal for themselves.  If either or both has spent 
time in prison before, they may be more likely to stay quiet in hopes that the other does as well 
and receive very little time in prison.  All of these choices come down to how much they trust 
each other. 
 Although no strategy can be eliminated because it is dominated by another strategy, there 
is an equilibrium in this situation.  The Nash-equilibrium applies to this situation.  This game is a 
non-zero sum game since the gain of one player does not equal the loss of the other player.  The 
equilibrium in this case is for both prisoners to confess.  This surprised me when I first computed 
the equilibrium, so I carefully examined each possible situation. 
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• If both Prisoner 1 and Prisoner 2 choose to stay silent: 
o Prisoner 2 would have incentive to switch to confessing to receive no prison time.  
Not an equilibrium 
o Prisoner 1 would have incentive to switch to confessing to receive no prison time.  
Not an equilibrium 
• If Prisoner 1 chooses to stay silent and Prisoner 2 chooses to confess: 
o Prisoner 1 would have incentive to switch to confessing also.  Not an 
equilibrium 
o Prisoner 2 has no incentive to switch to a different choice, but that doesn’t matter 
since Prisoner 1 has incentive to switch.  Not an equilibrium 
• If Prisoner 1 chooses to confess and Prisoner 2 chooses to stay silent: 
o Prisoner 1 would have no incentive to switch to a different choice. 
o Prisoner 2 would have incentive to switch to confessing also.  Not an 
equilibrium. 
• If both Prisoner 1 and Prisoner 2 choose to confess: 
o Prisoner 1 has no incentive to switch to a different option. 
o Prisoner 2 has no incentive to switch to a different option.  Equilibrium found 
 
It may seem crazy to some people, but the equilibrium for this situation is for both 
prisoners to confess and receive five years each in prison.  This does however make sense when 
you consider the questions I asked earlier.  The question of trust plays a huge role in this 
situation.  If one takes the chance and chooses to stay silent, they could either get very little time 
in prison, or get all the time in prison.  For both prisoners, the best option is for both to confess 
and split the time between them because with that choice neither has an advantage over the other. 
What happens when this situation occurs between two people more than once?  Robert 
Aumann, a Nobel Prize winner, found that rational players repeating this game over and over 
maintain the cooperative outcome.  Again, thinking logically, this makes sense.  If there is only 
one time that this situation will occur between two people, most individuals are more likely to 
look out for themselves first and not really worry too much about the other person.  Choosing to 
stay silent could lead to a big loss for one player if this is only happening for one game.  When 
individuals have many interactions together, they have a memory of what happened the last time 
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and that may affect what the choice that is made this time.  To test this theory of evolutionary 
cooperation, I played this iterated game with two different people and the average payouts of 
each were surprisingly different. 
To begin with, I explained the Prisoner’s Dilemma to each person that I played with.  
Instead of calling the choices “rat out” and “don’t rat out”, I made two cards and “N” card for not 
cooperate and a “C” card for cooperate (this means cooperate or not cooperate with each other, 
not the police).  We each had a set of these cards and we would make our choice and lay it face 
down on the table.  When both cards were on the table we would reveal our choices and I then 
recorded the outcome and computed our payoffs.  The payoffs were computed using a matrix 
similar to that in the original Prisoner’s Dilemma problem with the ½ ‘s being changed to 1’s to 
make it easier to compute average payout in the end.  The payoff matrix used for these iterated 
games is below. 
 Kacy 
Chris & 
Taryn 
 Cooperate Not Cooperate 
Cooperate (-1, -1) (-10,0) 
Not 
Cooperate (0,-10) (-5,-5) 
 
Robert Axelrod, a professor at the University of Michigan, is well known for his work on 
Evolutionary Cooperation.  Axelrod wrote a book entitled The Evolution of Cooperation (1984), 
in which he gives details about a tournament he organized where he invited many colleagues to 
develop computer programs that would play a strategy for an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
over and over.  He found that the best strategy developed was also the most simple and it was 
called “Tit for Tat”, and was developed by Anatol Rapaport.  The strategy was simple in that the 
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computer would cooperate the first iteration and then after that, simply do what the opponent did 
on the previous iteration. 
I first played with my husband and we played 100 games of this iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.  I am not sure if I didn’t explain the situation well enough or not, but I was slightly 
disappointed to see that the cooperation strategy was not upheld in this iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game.  I had previously decided that I was going to use the “Tit for Tat” strategy 
mentioned by Axelrod.  In the beginning, I forgot that “Tit for Tat” has the first iteration as 
cooperate so the first three iterations were not in that strategy, but I then began to use it the rest 
of the time.  My husband said he didn’t really have a strategy.  At times he said he was simply 
making the same choice for three iterations then switching for three iterations.  He then said he 
considered each iteration a new situation and that his opponent was someone he didn’t know so 
he was trying to do what was best for himself.  Although there were a few times where we were 
able to both cooperate, the rest were split between one cooperation and one non-cooperation and 
both non-cooperating (see Appendix A).  I was really surprised when I computed our average 
payoffs and we had exactly the same, -4.16 or 4.16 years in prison.  Even more surprising to me 
was that it was very close to the Nash Equilibrium of both of us confessing and receiving 5 years 
each.   
I played the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma again with a friend and had completely different 
results.  I stuck to the “Tit for Tat” strategy completely this time, and again we played 100 
iterations of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  Taryn, my opponent also started out with cooperation 
which meant that I would cooperate on the next turn.  This pattern continued for the entire 100 
iterations.  We did uphold the cooperation strategy and I must say that by the end we were both 
laughing because nothing had changed for either of us.  Computing our average payouts was 
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very easy since there were 100 iterations where we each received -1, 1 year in prison, so our 
average payout was 1 year in prison (see Appendix B).   
Although in both iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games that I played, the payoffs were the 
same, that is not always the case.  While playing with my husband, we played (N,C) the same 
number of times that we played (C,N) which is why we ended up having the same average 
payoff in the end.  With Taryn, since we both cooperated the entire time, we ended with the same 
average payoff.  Using the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma genuinely illustrates the evolution of 
cooperation within a species.  Going back to the original Prisoner’s Dilemma problem, if both 
players only had contact or interactions with each other once, then they would definitely do what 
is in their best interest.  With the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, we are able to see what can 
happen with multiple interactions.     
I began to think about applying this situation to actual interactions between individuals.  I 
can see how this can apply to negotiations between countries that may be in an arms race.  
Neither country can be certain what the other is doing so their immediate reaction may be to 
build up their weapons supply, but it is imperative to remember that this may not be the only 
negotiation with this other country and if one betrays now, the consequences during the next 
interaction could be drastic. 
What about a real-life example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma where one party is innocent 
and one is guilty? The innocent person is not likely to confess to something they didn’t do.  The 
guilty person, on the other hand, may only looking out for himself and confess and testify against 
the innocent person to receive no jail time 
I also think of honor boxes at places such as golf courses.  Early in the golf season, there 
may not be anyone available to actually work so an honor box is placed outside for people to pay 
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their fees.  It may be tempting for people to not pay (not cooperate), but if no one pays, then the 
honor system won’t work and will be taken away.  That may mean that the golf course is closed 
until people are available to be there which would ruin it for everyone. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a good example of what can happen when individuals are 
confronted with situations where they have to make a choice and that choice may hurt someone 
else.  The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma really showed me that it does matter how many “games” 
or interactions people may have before a trust or cooperation begins to emerge.  It may seem 
tempting to make the selfish choice, but the consequences of the next encounter could cost one 
or both dearly.   
Although cooperation between individuals and society is interesting, it is important to 
remember that this theory can illustrate how cooperation evolves within certain species.  
Thinking of a pack of wolves, a single wolf is only able to kill rather small prey on their own.  If 
the entire pack were to work together, they would be able to kill larger prey and have food 
available for all.  Cooperation between individuals is an important part of what makes life within 
a species, and society, work.  Individuals within the population that are able to cooperate with 
each other are rewarded through the acquiring of resources.  Non cooperation however, has dire 
consequences that may result in the loss of fitness within a species.  Using game theory and 
iterated games to help predict cooperative behavior has many implications in the social sciences 
and even in government.     
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Appendix A 
 
Game # Me Chris 
My 
Score 
Chris 
Score Game # Me Chris
My 
Score 
Chris 
Score 
1 N C 0 -10 51 C C -1 -1 
2 N N -5 -5 52 C N -10 0 
3 C C -1 -1 53 N C 0 -10 
4 C N -10 0 54 C C -1 -1 
5 N N -5 -5 55 C C -1 -1 
6 N C 0 -10 56 C N -10 0 
7 C N -10 0 57 N N -5 -5 
8 N C 0 -10 58 N C 0 -10 
9 C N -10 0 59 C C -1 -1 
10 N C 0 -10 60 C N -10 0 
11 C C -1 -1 61 N C 0 -10 
12 C N -10 0 62 C N -10 0 
13 N N -5 -5 63 N C 0 -10 
14 N C 0 -10 64 C C -1 -1 
15 C C -1 -1 65 C C -1 -1 
16 C N -10 0 66 C C -1 -1 
17 N N -5 -5 67 C N -10 0 
18 N C 0 -10 68 N N -5 -5 
19 C N -10 0 69 N N -5 -5 
20 N C 0 -10 70 N N -5 -5 
21 C N -10 0 71 N C 0 -10 
22 N N -5 -5 72 C C -1 -1 
23 N C 0 -10 73 C C -1 -1 
24 C C -1 -1 74 C N -10 0 
25 C C -1 -1 75 N N -5 -5 
26 C N -10 0 76 N N -5 -5 
27 N C 0 -10 77 N C 0 -10 
28 C N -10 0 78 C C -1 -1 
29 N C 0 -10 79 C C -1 -1 
30 C N -10 0 80 C N -10 0 
31 N C 0 -10 81 N N -5 -5 
32 C N -10 0 82 N N -5 -5 
33 N C 0 -10 83 N N -5 -5 
34 C C -1 -1 84 N C 0 -10 
35 C N -10 0 85 C C -1 -1 
36 N N -5 -5 86 C N -10 0 
37 N C 0 -10 87 N C 0 -10 
38 C N -10 0 88 C C -1 -1 
39 N C 0 -10 89 C N -10 0 
40 C N -10 0 90 N N -5 -5 
41 N N -5 -5 91 N C 0 -10 
42 N C 0 -10 92 C N -10 0 
43 C N -10 0 93 N N -5 -5 
44 N C 0 -10 94 N C 0 -10 
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45 C C -1 -1 95 C N -10 0 
46 C N -10 0 96 N C 0 -10 
47 N C 0 -10 97 C C -1 -1 
48 C N -10 0 98 C N -10 0 
49 N N -5 -5 99 N C 0 -10 
50 N C 0 -10 100 C N -10 0 
   -217 -227    -199 -189 
          
Kacy - Average Payout =  -4.16 Chris - Average Payout =  -4.16 
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Appendix B 
 
Game # Me Taryn 
My 
Score 
Taryn 
Score Game # Me Taryn
My 
Score 
Taryn 
Score 
1 C C -1 -1 51 C C -1 -1 
2 C C -1 -1 52 C C -1 -1 
3 C C -1 -1 53 C C -1 -1 
4 C C -1 -1 54 C C -1 -1 
5 C C -1 -1 55 C C -1 -1 
6 C C -1 -1 56 C C -1 -1 
7 C C -1 -1 57 C C -1 -1 
8 C C -1 -1 58 C C -1 -1 
9 C C -1 -1 59 C C -1 -1 
10 C C -1 -1 60 C C -1 -1 
11 C C -1 -1 61 C C -1 -1 
12 C C -1 -1 62 C C -1 -1 
13 C C -1 -1 63 C C -1 -1 
14 C C -1 -1 64 C C -1 -1 
15 C C -1 -1 65 C C -1 -1 
16 C C -1 -1 66 C C -1 -1 
17 C C -1 -1 67 C C -1 -1 
18 C C -1 -1 68 C C -1 -1 
19 C C -1 -1 69 C C -1 -1 
20 C C -1 -1 70 C C -1 -1 
21 C C -1 -1 71 C C -1 -1 
22 C C -1 -1 72 C C -1 -1 
23 C C -1 -1 73 C C -1 -1 
24 C C -1 -1 74 C C -1 -1 
25 C C -1 -1 75 C C -1 -1 
26 C C -1 -1 76 C C -1 -1 
27 C C -1 -1 77 C C -1 -1 
28 C C -1 -1 78 C C -1 -1 
29 C C -1 -1 79 C C -1 -1 
30 C C -1 -1 80 C C -1 -1 
31 C C -1 -1 81 C C -1 -1 
32 C C -1 -1 82 C C -1 -1 
33 C C -1 -1 83 C C -1 -1 
34 C C -1 -1 84 C C -1 -1 
35 C C -1 -1 85 C C -1 -1 
36 C C -1 -1 86 C C -1 -1 
37 C C -1 -1 87 C C -1 -1 
38 C C -1 -1 88 C C -1 -1 
39 C C -1 -1 89 C C -1 -1 
40 C C -1 -1 90 C C -1 -1 
41 C C -1 -1 91 C C -1 -1 
42 C C -1 -1 92 C C -1 -1 
43 C C -1 -1 93 C C -1 -1 
44 C C -1 -1 94 C C -1 -1 
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45 C C -1 -1 95 C C -1 -1 
46 C C -1 -1 96 C C -1 -1 
47 C C -1 -1 97 C C -1 -1 
48 C C -1 -1 98 C C -1 -1 
49 C C -1 -1 99 C C -1 -1 
50 C C -1 -1 100 C C -1 -1 
   -50 -50    -50 -50 
          
Kacy - Average Payout =  -1 Taryn - Average Payout =  -1 
          
 
